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I. INTRODUCTION 
The hyperbole directed at the Supreme Court's Citizens United v. 
FEC1
Critics of the decision attack it from several fronts.  First, they 
question its departure from what is argued to be “long settled 
precedent.”
 opinion is exceeded only by the misinformation surrounding it.  In 
this brief essay I hope to raise and rebut the key points typically made to 
attack the decision, and persuade the reader that, whatever the policy 
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  Second, they question whether the activity at issue – 
independent expenditures of money in elections, is really “speech.”  
Lastly, they complain that the Court has illegitimately extended to 
corporations constitutional protections that should only apply to people.  
All of these arguments are weak, unconvincing, and potentially 
dangerous. 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 2.  Nan Aron, It is Time To Take Back the Courts, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 29, 2010, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nan-aron/it-is-time-to-take-back-t_b_442050.html; See also 
President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, Jan. 27, 2010 (chastising the majority for 
“overturn[ing] more than a century of precedent.”). 
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II. PRECEDENT?  WHAT PRECEDENT? 
Justice Kennedy's Citizens United opinion is attacked as a departure 
from long-standing precedent.3  In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized 
the majority for neglecting the Court's usual standards for overturning 
precedent.4  Stevens asserted that the majority simply did not like the 
1990 holding in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which 
upheld a state statute barring a business association from spending 
general treasury funds in state elections.5  Stevens listed the Court's 
usual considerations as, first, the “antiquity of the precedent”; second, 
the workability of the legal rule; and third, the reliance interests at 
stake.6
Granting Stevens' list for the sake of argument, let us examine each 
of these, in turn, as they relate to the ban on independent expenditures.  
Is the Austin precedent “antique?”  Austin dated to 1990, which for some 
of my students may seem like ancient history, but in the context of 
political regulation, is not.  The law at issue dates to 1947,
 
7
One would be wrong.  In United States v. CIO, the test case brought 
by organized labor immediately after the law's enactment, the Court 
refused to allow the expenditure ban to reach a CIO publication 
endorsing a federal candidate.
 so one might 
be forgiven for presuming that the Court's precedents also included 
decisions from that era considering and upholding the ban. 
8  The Court broadened this limited 
construction less than a decade later to prohibit a union-sponsored 
television series in United States v. UAW-CIO, but the Court again 
refused to reach the constitutional question.9  Until Austin, cases raising 
corporate expenditures in federal court only tested the scope of 
“expenditure,” or whether something short of “express advocacy” could 
be constitutionally prohibited.10  In short, the Court first confronted the 
constitutionality of the 1947 expenditure ban in 1990.11
 
 3. See id. 
  Thus, the law 
was under a constitutional cloud for about forty-three years, and Austin 
 4. 130 S. Ct. at 940. 
 5. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).  
 6. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct at 940. 
 7. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, §304, 61 Stat. 
136, 159-60. 
 8. 335 U.S. 106 (1948). 
 9. See 352 U.S. 567 (1957). 
 10.  See, e.g., Massachusetts Citizens for Life v. FEC, 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
 11. See Austin, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).   
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presided for only about twenty.  The “antique” precedent is, in truth, a 
very mixed bag. 
How about the workability of the legal rule?  Stevens noted that 
“no one has argued to us that Austin's rule has proved impracticable.”12  
Yet many of the more controversial campaign finance practices are 
simply less direct and accountable ways of engaging in the political 
speech banned by the law.  The Federal Election Commission took an 
entire unhappy decade to produce rules governing the use of corporate 
and labor resources in the wake of MCFL,13 Austin, and high profile 
enforcement matters.14 Soft money and “issue ads”, the campaign 
finance bugaboos of the 1990s addressed in McCain-Feingold,15 
provided a way for funding sources prevented from making express 
advocacy expenditures to address political issues, and thereby assist their 
favored candidates and parties.16  The rise of the so-called “527” tax-
exempt vehicle for political activity, again provided a means for 
corporations and unions (and wealthy individuals) to engage in 
politics.17
Stevens' third criticism invokes reliance interests.  Reliance on 
what?  The constitutionality of the law?  Access to other means of 
participation?  It boggles the mind to think that anyone who has lived 
through the last two decades of campaign finance and elections would 
believe this to be an area of stable and broadly accepted doctrine.  
Outside of the national security context, I cannot think of an area that is 
more capricious. 
  The notion that the expenditure ban kept corporate and labor 
money out of politics is wrong – what it did was drive that activity 
below the radar screen and create a market for campaign finance 
lawyers.  If a law's workability is tested by its clarity and efficacy, the 
expenditure ban flunks the test. 
 
 12. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 940 (2010). 
 13. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding that the Federal Election 
Campaign Act’s prohibition on direct corporate expenditures for an election was unconstitutional as 
applied to a non-profit.) 
 14. Final Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,292 (July 6, 1995), revised December 14, 1995, 60 
Fed. Reg. 64,260 (Dec. 15, 1995), effective March 13, 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 10,269 (Mar. 13, 1996). 
 15. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold Act), Pub. L. 107-155, 116 
Stat. 81 (2002). 
 16.  See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (noting distinction between prohibited 
express advocacy and permissible issue advocacy). 
 17.  See Emily's List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir 2009). 
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Accordingly, even if we adopt Stevens' standards for when the 
Court should overturn precedent, it is clear that Austin needs to be 
reexamined.18
III. SPEECH!  SPEECH! 
 
Critics of the majority opinion in Citizens United also argue that the 
decision erroneously equates money and speech.19
The government can, nonetheless, restrict the use of money for 
expression if it has a sufficiently weighty interest.  Laws against libel 
and slander, which require “publication” that often involves spending 
money, are one example.  The Constitution does not protect the use of 
money to perpetuate a fraud, pay for espionage or prostitution, or 
produce obscenity, despite the fact that each of these activities is also 
expressive.  In these contexts, the speech itself justifies the law.  There is 
no such interest supporting the corporate expenditure ban in 
expenditures.  Instead, the ban pivots on the identity of the speaker as a 
corporation. 
  But saying “money is 
not speech – it is property” provides no insight into any constitutional 
principle.  Similarly, my computer is not speech but property (as the 
Commonwealth of Virginia reminds me whenever the personal property 
taxes are due).  If agents from the Commonwealth taxed me for using 
my computer to blog about politics, would anyone question that my 
freedom of speech had been violated?  Money is not religion, either; but 
if the government barred me from tithing would anyone question that 
this imposed an unconstitutional burden on my free exercise of religion?  
Constitutional rights do not float around in some abstract cloud.  
Constitutional rights are exercised by individuals and groups, using their 
property, including their money. 
Still other speech-restrictive laws rely, not on the unprotected 
content of speech, but on its context.  The First Amendment provides 
more governmental latitude to restrict speech in prisons,20 in the 
military,21 in government offices,22 and in schools.23
 
 18. During argument in Citizens United, even the government abandoned the Austin 
precedent.  Rather than relying on the anti-distortion principle upon which the statute in Austin was 
upheld, the government argued that anti-corruption and shareholder-protection interests justified 
restrictions on corporate expenditures.  130 S. Ct. at 903. 
  While these 
 19. Press Release, Sen. Christopher S. Dodd, Dodd to Introduce Constitutional Amendment to 
Reverse Campaign Finance Ruling (Feb. 4, 2010), http://dodd.senate.gov/?q=node/5459. 
 20. See e.g.,Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006) (upholding the principle that 
restrictions on prisoners need only be “reasonably related’ to legitimate penological interests”). 
 21. See e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).  
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examples stand for the proposition that government can restrict the 
speech of individuals under its control or in its custody, they provide no 
guidance in the Citizens United context, where a private corporation 
wants to reach society at large about candidates. 
IV. SOME OF MY BEST FRIENDS ARE CORPORATIONS 
Finally, it is said that Citizens United extended civil liberties to 
corporations that belong only to people, and that this is a very bad 
development.24  In protest, some clever folks have even filed a 
corporation as a candidate for office25.  These critics observe that the 
constitution protects “We the People” from governmental overreach, and 
that “people” literally means living, breathing individuals, not entities.26  
Some argue that the roots of the Revolution were anti-corporate, as 
shown by the Boston Tea Party.27
Ironically, the latter-day Tea Party groups function via the 
corporate form – Tea Party Patriots, for instance, is a tax exempt social 
welfare organization under IRC 501(c)(4)
 
28.  It is difficult for any group 
of “the people” to do much at all in modern society without the 
superstructure of a “corporation.”  Once incorporated, the group can 
enter into leases, open bank accounts, take out parade permits, register 
domain names as a group – without placing any individual member at 
risk of liability, or the group at the risk of that individual's reliability.  
When Justice Stevens asserts that corporations are not members of 
society,29
 
 22. See,e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)  
 one wonders in what society he lives. 
 23. See e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).  For an overview of free speech law 
within those contexts, see Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners - Oh, My! A 
Cautionary Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 U.C.L.A. 
L. REV. 1635 (2007). 
 24. See Lyle Denniston, Analysis: The Personhood of Corporations, SCOTUSBLOG, (Jan. 21, 
2010, 18:45 EST), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/analysis-the-personhood-of-corporations/. 
 25. The company is Murray Hill.  See MURRAY HILL, http://murrayhillweb.com/pr-
012510.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2010). 
 26. See Charles A. Reich, A Passion for Justice, 26 TOURO L. REV. 393, 430 (2010) (asking if 
corporations are a legitimate part of “We the People”). 
 27. For a recounting of anti-corporate sentiment in colonial America, see Dale Rubin, 
Corporate Personhood, How the Courts Have Employed Bogus Jurisprudence to Grant 
Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523, 525-34 
(2010). 
 28. About Tea Party Patriots, http://www.teapartypatriots.org/AboutUs.aspx (last visited July 
6, 2010). 
 29. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 (2010). 
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Significantly, the Court in Citizens United recognized that one way 
to resolve the case would be to craft a version of the expenditure ban that 
would keep political groups like Citizens United free to speak30  This is 
much the approach taken by the Court in its 1986 Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life decision.31  There, Justice Brennan, writing for the 
Court, concluded that a pro-life group with no shareholders, organized 
for political and policy purposes, was not the kind of corporation that 
posed a risk of corruption justifying the expenditure ban.32  Obviously, 
not all corporations are alike, but the expenditure ban treats them alike.  
We should object to such an overbroad statute as the Citizens United 
Majority did,33
Finally, any argument that attempts to cut off corporations from 
constitutional protection is dangerous.  The Constitution protects the 
“freedom of speech” without designating which speakers are protected.
 and expect that the better party to craft a constitutional 
law would be Congress, not the Supreme Court. 
34  
It is speech itself that is protected, and governmental censorship of 
disfavored sources is exactly what the Constitution does not allow.  
Imagine a world where corporate speech rights were not protected by the 
First Amendment.  Congress could censor the speech of corporations to 
prevent them from criticizing legislation.  Federal agencies could debar 
federal contractors because of their stated positions on public issues.  
The FCC could require licensees to carry propaganda.  Given that 
newspapers and broadcasting facilities are operated by corporations, it is 
easy to see that this doctrine flips the freedom of speech on its head.35
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Only time will tell whether Citizens United marks a dramatic 
change in political regulation.  I believe the chances of a dramatic 
change are slim because the decision is simply a straightforward 
application of First Amendment principles.  The Court seized the 
opportunity to clarify an incoherent area of the law, and confirmed the 
constitutional protection of speech per se.  What may prove regrettable is 
the hasty reaction of legislators to the decision, and the potential 
adoption of unwise restrictions with unintended consequences. 
 
 30.  Id. at 892. 
 31. 479 U.S. at 263-64. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930. 
 34. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”  U.S. CONST. 
amend I, § 1. 
 35.  See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899-900. 
